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Abstract
We formalize, in the AF2-type system, a completeness and correctness theorem for a modi3ed
Kripke semantics for minimal logic. We show that any program extracted from a proof of the
completeness theorem translates higher-order encoding of a -term into a Debruijn encoding
of another -term with the same type. We also show that any program extracted from the
correctness theorem performs the reverse translation. Moreover, in both cases, there is one proof
which corresponds to a program that does not change the underlying -term. c© 2001 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The Curry–Howard isomorphism [2] establishes a correspondence between proofs and
programs. We can extract a correct program from a proof of its speci3cation. But to
what speci3cation corresponds a mathematical theorem like the completeness theorem?
More precisely, is there a property characterizing any program extracted from a proof
of the completeness theorem. We will answer this question for the case of minimal
logic [1] using a variation on Kripke semantics [3].
We formalize the syntax and the semantics of minimal logic in the AF2-type system
[4]. (This system is the second-order intuitionnistic logic with program extraction.)
We prove (Theorem 9) that a -term extracted from a proof of the provability of
a formula F in minimal logic is a Debruijn representation of a -term of type F
(in simply typed -calculus). We mean by a Debruijn representation an encoding of
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-terms in -calculus where a bound variable is encoded by the number of abstractions
separating it from its binder.
We establish a similar result (Theorem 26) for a proof that a formula F is true in
every model, but, instead of a Debruijn representation, we get a higher-order represen-
tation, where bound variables are encoded using -abstractions. The semantics we use
is a variation on the Kripke semantics [3]. The main di%erence is the use of a binary
function instead of an ordering. This function can be seen as the concatenation of two
paths in a Kripke tree. Using functions allows us to use equational axioms which enjoy
a trivial algorithmic contents.
From these two results, we deduce (Theorem 27) that any term extracted from a
proof of the completeness Theorem 23 translates an higher-order encoding of a simply
typed -term to the Debruijn encoding of a term of the same type. We also get the
reverse translation from any proof of the correctness Theorem 14.
An important point in this work is the precise choice of the de3nition to simplify the
term as much as possible and get only the essential algorithmic meaning of the theorem.
Indeed, the natural de3nition of provable and true would have had more information
(all quanti3cations would have been restricted to formulas or contexts) inducing some
noise in the extracted program.
This simpli3cation of the de3nitions results in more general completeness and cor-
rectness theorems than usual. Indeed, we do not have to know that formulas and
contexts are well founded. However, we need some equational axioms that could be
proven if we add the hypothesis that contexts and formulas were well founded.
Our result is similar to Krivine’s result for 3rst-order classical logic [6], with one
main di%erence: we 3nd a proof of the completeness theorem whose extracted term
translates an higher-order encoding of any -term t to the Debruijn encoding of the
same term (see Theorem 25). We think that the same result is impossible for the classi-
cal logic or the intuitionnistic logic with the disjunction or the existential quanti3er (for
semantics similar to the usual Kripke semantics). A proof of these conjectures would
give a concrete argument to say that the semantics of minimal logic is much simpler and
nearer to the syntax than the semantics of classical logic or the Kripke semantics for the
full intuitionnistic logic. This let us hope programs extraction could be a tool to com-
pare the strength of similar theorems, which are not formally related with one another.
One should also note that the completeness and correctness theorems have been
machine checked using the author’s implementation of the AF2-type system. However,
the proof about the extracted terms have not been machine checked (this would require
a formalization of the AF2 realizability yet to be done).
2. Preliminaries
We use Krivine’s notation for the -calculus (except for the application where
we use the standard LISP notation) and his notation and results for the AF2-type
system [4].
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To avoid confusion, we use  S t :F for sequent in simply-typed -calculus and
 AF2 t :F for AF2 sequent. Moreover, we use the following abbreviations and nota-
tions:
• A→B→C for A→ (B→C);
• ∀xA→B for (∀xA)→B;
• ∀x; y :AB for ∀x(A(x)→∀y(A(y)→B));
•  is the set of all -terms;
• P() is the set of subsets of  closed under -equivalence.
We recall the following de3nitions and lemma from [4]:
Denition 1 (Interpretation). An interpretation : is given by three mappings:
• A mapping from 3rst-order variables to -terms denoted x → |x|;
• A mapping from function symbols of arity n to n-ary functions from n to  denoted
f → |f|;
• A mapping from predicate variables of arity n to n-ary functions from n to P()
denoted X → |X |.
As usual, we write [x⇐ t] or [X ⇐] when we change the value of the mapping
 for x or X only. This mapping is extended to any term and formula by:
• |f(t1; : : : ; tn)| = |f|(|t1|; : : : ; |tn|);
• |X (t1; : : : ; tn)| = |X |(|t1|; : : : ; |tn|);
• |A→B| = {t ∈; ∀u∈ |A|; (t u)∈ |B|};
• |∀xA| = ⋂t∈ |A|[x⇐ t];
• |∀XA| = ⋂∈n→P() |A|[X ⇐].
Lemma 2 (Adequation lemma). For any formula A and any interpretation , we have
AF2 t :F implies t ∈ |F |:
Denition 3 (Data types). A predicate D of arity one is a data-type 1 for an interpre-
tation  if and only if for any 3rst-order term v and any -term t, t ∈ |D(v)| implies
t ∼ |v|.
3. The formalization of minimal logic
Denition 4. Let us choose an in3nite countable set of variables V, one unary function
symbol x → Kx and one binary function symbol f⇒ g. We de3ne the set of formulas
as the smallest set such that 2 :
∀x :VF( Kx) and ∀f; g :FF(f⇒ g):
1 Krivine also states that |D(v)| is non-empty if and only if t is intentionally of type D (for integer this
means that if |N(v)| is non-empty then v really represents an integer). Since we do not use this, we give
a simpli3ed de3nition.
2 We cannot identify the formula x and the variable x if we want Proposition 6 to hold.
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This is formally de3ned by the following second-order formula:
F(f)=∀X (∀x :VX ( Kx)→∀g; h(X (g)→X (h)→X (g⇒ h))→X (f)):
Denition 5. We de3ne contexts as ordered lists. We use a symbol ∅ for the empty list
and a binary function symbol cons written a; y → ay to construct lists. The predicate
de3ning lists of elements of D is
LD(l)=∀X (X (∅)→∀a :D ∀y :XX (ay)→X (l)):
Theorem 6. The predicates F and LF are data-types (Denition 3) for an interpre-
tation  if the following holds:
• The predicate V dening variables is a data-type for ;
• | Kx| ∼ ab(a |x|);
• |f⇒ g| ∼ ab(b |f| |g|);
• |∅| ∼ aba;
• |x l| ∼ ab(b |x| |l|).
Proof. The proofs for lists and trees can be found in [4] and the proof for formulas
is identical to the proof for trees.
Denition 7. We de3ne the provability as the smallest binary relation  such that
∀C;f (fC  f) (axiom);
∀C;f; g (C  f→ gC  f) (weakening);
∀C;f; g (fC  g→C  f⇒ g) (implication introduction);
∀C;f; g (C  f⇒ g→C  f→C  g) (implication elimination):
Formally, this predicate is de3ned by the following second-order predicate:
C f=∀X


∀f;CX (fC;f)→∀f; g; C(X (C;f)→X (gC; f))→
∀f; g; C(X (fC; g)→X (C;f⇒ g))→
∀f; g; C(X (C;f⇒ g)→X (C;f)→X (C; g))→
X (C;f)

 :
One should note that with this de3nition, C f does not imply that C is a list of
formulas or f is a formula. We could add more conditions in the de3nition, but the
-term extracted from a proof of C  f will then be more complex.
Denition 8. We say that a -term t is an internal Debruijn representation of a closed
term u if t= zslat′ and ‖t′‖∅= u where ‖t′‖c is the partial function taking as
arguments a term and a list of variables and de3ned by
• ‖z‖xc = x;
• ‖(st1)‖xc = ‖t1‖c;
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• ‖(lt1)‖c = x‖t1‖xc where x ∈ c;
• ‖(at1t2)‖c =(‖t1‖c ‖t2‖c).
Formally, the de3nition of ‖t′‖c depends on the choice of the variables z; s; l; a but we
omit these parameters in the notation.
You may notice that the internal Debruijn representations of a term u are not unique
because of the freedom in the position of the weakening denoted by the variable s
(usually, weakenings only occur at the variable level). For instance, zsla (l (l (s
(az z)))) and zsla (l (l (a (s z)(s; z)))) are two internal Debruijn representations for
the term xy(x x).
Theorem 9. For any term t and any formula f, if AF2 t : (∅f) then t is -
equivalent to an internal Debruijn representation of a closed -term u such that
S u : f.
This theorem means that a term t extracted from a proof, in the second-order logic,
that a formula f is provable in minimal logic is an internal Debruijn representation of
a term u of type f in simply-typed -calculus.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we use the adequation lemma, which implies that for
any interpretation  we have t ∈ |∅f|.
We choose an interpretation  such that for any 3rst-order terms  and ′ design-
ing formulas or lists of formulas, we have ||∼ |′| implies =′ (i). Such an
interpretation exists, we just need to choose  such that the type of formulas and lists
of formulas are data-types using Proposition 6.
We choose four -variables z; s; a; l not free in t and we de3ne, for any -terms t; t′,
(t; t′) the smallest sets closed under -equivalence such that
• z ∈(|fC|; |f|);
• (st1)∈(|gC|; |f|) if t1 ∈(|C|; |f|);
• (lt1)∈(|C|; |f⇒ g|) if t1 ∈(|fC|; |g|);
• (at1t2)∈(|C|; |g|) if t1 ∈(|C|; |f|) and t2 ∈(|C|; |f⇒ g|).
We 3rst show, by induction on the de3nition of , that t1 ∈(|C|; |f|), t1 normal,
l= x1; : : : ; xn with the xi distinct and C =f1; : : : ; fn implies x1 :f1; : : : ; xn :fn S ‖t1‖l :f
(ii). Each case in the induction is the immediate using property (i) and the de3nition
of  and ‖t1‖l.
Then we de3ne the interpretation ′= [X=] and we prove the following properties :
• z ∈ |∀f;CX (fC;f)|′ ;
• s∈ |∀f; g; C (X (C;f)→X (gC; f))|′ ;
• l∈ |∀f; g; C (X (fC; g)→X (C;f⇒ g))|′ ;
• a∈ |∀f; g ∀C (X (C;f⇒ g)→X (C;f)→X (C; g))|′ .
This is immediate: when we apply the de3nition of the interpretation, each condition
corresponds to one of the conditions in the de3nition of .
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Then, we have t ∈ |∅  f| implies (t z s la)∈ |X (C;f)|′ =(|∅|; |f|). Thus, using
(ii) we 3nd (t z s la) ∼ t′ with S ‖t′‖∅ :f. This means that t is -equivalent to a
term starting with four abstractions (otherwise ‖t′‖∅ would be unde3ned) which implies
t ∼ zslat′ (because z; s; a; l are not free in t). Thus t is an internal Debruijn
representation of a term u (u= ‖t′‖∅) with S u :f.
4. Formalization of the semantics of minimal logic
Denition 10. A model is given by a binary operation ◦, a constant e, and a predicate
M satisfying the following conditions:
• M0(◦)=∀p; q; rp ◦ (q ◦ r)= (p ◦ q) ◦ r (◦ is associative);
• M1(◦; e)=∀p e ◦p=p;
• M2(◦; M)=∀f; g;p
( ∀q(∀r M (r ◦ (q ◦ p); f)→M (q ◦ p; g))→
M (p;f⇒ g)
)
;
• M3(M)=∀f; g;p(M (p; f⇒ g)→M (p; f)→M (p; g)) .
Such a model is very similar to a kripke tree model. Indeed, if we consider that a
point in a tree is denoted by his path and that ◦ is the concatenation of paths in a tree,
then our de3nition is equivalent to the usual one. We just replace p¿q by p= r ◦ q.
The only di%erence is that we do not require the truth to increase when we climb
the tree. Instead, in M2, we check that the formula is true at every point above q ◦ p.
The truth of f at p is not M (p; f) but ∀qM (q ◦p; f).
Denition 11. The truth can be de3ned as being true in every model. This is formalized
by the following predicate:
Truth(f)=∀o∀e ∀M
(
M0(o)→M1(o; e)→M2(o;M)→M3(M)→
∀p M (p;f)
)
:
Denition 12. We say that a -term t is an higher-order representation of a term u if
t is closed, t= lat′ and ‖t′‖= u where ‖t′‖ is the partial function taking a term as
argument and de3ned by
• ‖x‖= x;
• ‖(lxt1)‖= x‖t1‖;
• ‖(lt1)‖= x‖(t1 x)‖ if t1 does not start with  and x not free in t1;
• ‖(at1t2)‖=(‖t1‖ ‖t2‖).
This de3nition is well founded, because the number of occurrences of l or a decreases
in each recursive call. Formally, ‖t′‖ depends on the choice of the variables l and a
but we omit these parameters in the notation.
We need the two cases for l, because we can extract terms containing sub-terms of
the form (l (a; t)) ∼) (lx(atx)) from proofs of Truth(f).
C. Ra,alli / Theoretical Computer Science 254 (2001) 259–271 265
Proposition 13. For any term t and any formula f, if AF2 t : Truth(f) then (t (x x)
(x x)) is -equivalent to an higher-order representation of a closed -term u.
This proposition is weaker than the corresponding Theorem 9 for provability. The
stronger theorem which also states that u is of type f will be given later
(Theorem 26).
Proof. Let T be the following formula:
T =∀M
( ∀X (X →X )→∀X (X →X )→
((M →M)→M)→ (M →M →M)→M
)
:
This formula is obtained from Truth(f) by erasing all 3rst-order information.
We choose t such that AF2 t : Truth(f). Therefore, we have AF2 t :T and using the
adequation lemma, we have t ∈ |T | for any interpretation .
We choose two -variables a; l and an in3nite set of variables {xn}n∈N not free in t.
We de3ne  the smallest set closed under -equivalence such that:
• xn ∈ for all n∈N;
• (lt1)∈ if ∀n∈N (t1 xn)∈;
• (at1t2)∈ if t1 ∈ and t2 ∈.
We show, by induction on the de3nition of , that t ∈ and t normal imply that ‖t‖
is de3ned (i) and the free variables of ‖t‖ are among {a; b}∪ {xn}n∈N (ii). The only
non-trivial case is when t=(lt1). Then we choose xn not free in t1 and we distinguish
two cases:
• If t1 does not start with , we have (t1 xn)∈ and normal (by de3nition of ).
By induction hypothesis, we get ‖(t1 xn)‖ de3ned and (ii) for (t1 xn). Therefore
‖(lt1)‖= xn ‖(t1 xn)‖ is de3ned and (lt1) satis3es (ii).
• If t1 = x t2 then t2[x=xn] is normal and t2[x=xn]∈. Thus by induction hypothesis,
we get ‖t2[x=xn]‖ de3ned and (ii) for t2[x=xn]. Therefore ‖(lt1)‖= x ‖t2‖= xn ‖t2
[x=xn]‖ is de3ned (because ‖t1[x=y]‖= ‖t1‖[x=y] is immediate by induction on t1)
and (lt1) satis3es (ii).
We de3ne the interpretation ′= [M=] and we prove the following properties:
• x x∈ |∀X (X →X )|′ ;
• l∈ |(M →M)→M |′ ;
• a∈ |M →M →M |′ .
The 3rst condition is trivial and the last one uses the third case in the de3nition of .
For the second one, we choose v∈→ and we must prove (lv)∈. For any n∈N
we 3nd (v xn)∈ because xn ∈. Thus, we have (lv)∈.
Therefore, we have t ∈ |T | implies (t)x x x x la∈ |M |′ =. Thus, using (ii) we
3nd t′ ∼ (t (x x) (x x) la) with ‖t′‖ de3ned. From this we get (t (x x) (x x)) ∼
lat′ (because a; l are not free in t) with lat′ closed (because the xn variables were
also chosen not free in t). We have what we wanted: (t (x x) (x x)) is an higher-order
representation of ‖t′‖.
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5. Correctness
Theorem 14 (Correctness of the semantics).
∀f(∅  f→Truth(f)):
Proof. Together with the proof, we give the extracted term. We assume ∅  f and
we choose an arbitrary model de3ned by ◦; e; M . We must prove M (p;f). We de3ne
the following predicate:
ML(p;C)=∀qLM (q◦p)(C):
ML(p;C) means that C is a list of formulas true at any point above p. We easily
prove the following lemmas about ML:
(1) ∀p0; f0; c(ML(p0; f0 c)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0));
(2) ∀p0; f0; c(ML(p0; f0 c)→ML(p0; c)).
The term car and cdr extracted, respectively, from (1) and (2) implement the usual
destructors for lists (this is an easy consequence of Proposition 6 and the adequation
lemma). Now to do the induction, we substitute the following predicate to the variable
X in ∅  f:
C; f0∀p0(ML(p0; C)→∀qM (h(q; p0)f0)):
Therefore, we will get the expected conclusion M (p;f) if we prove the following
properties:
• ∀f0; C; p0 (ML(p0; f0 C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0)) which is (1).
• ∀f0; g; C
( ∀p0(ML(p0; C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0))→
∀p0(ML(p0; gC)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0))
)
which is immediate using (2).
The extracted term is weakcr= uc(u (cdr c)).
• ∀f0; g; C
( ∀p0(ML(p0; f0 C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; g))→
∀p0(ML(p0; C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0⇒ g))
)
which is easy using ∀p0; q;
rp0 ◦ (q ◦ r)= (p0 ◦ q) ◦ r; ∀p0 e ◦ p0 =p0 and l :M2(◦; M). The extracted term
is lamcr[l] = uc(lx(u (cons x c))) where cons implements the expected opera-
tion on lists.
• ∀f0; g; C

 ∀p0(ML(p0; C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0⇒ g))→∀p0(ML(p0; C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; f0))→
∀p0(ML(p0; C)→∀qM (q ◦ p0; g))

 which is easy using ∀p0;
q; rp0 ◦ (q ◦ r)= (p0 ◦ q) ◦ r;∀p0e ◦ p0 =p0 and a :M3(M). The extracted term is
appcr[a] = uvc(a (uc) (vc)).
• ML(p; ∅) which is trivial. The extracted term is nil= xfx.
The term extracted from the all proof is
cr= te1e2la(t car weakcr lamcr[l] appcr[a] nil):
Lemma 15. We dene = [z=car; s=weakcr; l=lamcr[l]; a=appcr[a]] and; for c=
xn; : : : ; x1; Kc= af(fxn (fxn−1 : : : (fx1 a) : : :)). We have ‖t′‖c = u implies that t′′ the
normal form of (t′) Kc exists and ‖t′′‖= u.
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Proof. We prove this by induction on the term t′. By de3nition of ‖t′‖c, we are in
one of the following cases:
• If t′= z then (t′ Kc) ∼ (car Kc). As ‖z‖c is de3ned, c starts with a variable x and
u= x. We can take t′′= x.
• If t′=(st′1) then (t′ Kc) ∼ (weakcr t′1 Kc) ∼ (t′1 (cdr; Kc)). We have c= xc′ and
‖t′‖c = ‖t′1‖c′ = u which gives what we want using the induction hypothesis.
• If t′=(lt′1) then (t′ Kc) ∼ (lamcr[l] t′1 Kc) ∼ (lx(t′1 (Cons x Kc))). We have ‖t′‖c=
x‖t′1‖xc and the induction hypothesis gives (t′1 (Cons x Kc)) ∼ t′′1 normal with
‖t′′1 ‖= ‖t′1‖xc. Then, we take t′′=(lx t′′1 ) and we get what we expected.
• If t′=(at′1 t′2) then (t′ Kc) ∼ (appcr[a] t′1t′2 Kc) ∼ (a (t′1 Kc) (t′2 Kc)). We have
‖t′‖c =(‖t′1‖c)‖t′2‖c and the induction hypothesis gives (t′1)c∼ t′′1 normal with
‖t′′1 ‖= ‖t′1‖c and the same for t′2. We take t′′=(a t′′1 t′′2 ) and we get what we wanted.
Theorem 16. If t is -equivalent to an internal Debruijn representation of a term u
then (cr t) is -equivalent to an higher-order representation of u.
Proof. Let t be an internal Debruijn representation of a term u. We have t∼
zsla t′ with ‖t′‖∅= u. Then (cr t) ∼ e1e2la(t′ K∅) where  is the substitu-
tion de3ned in the proof of the previous lemma (because nil= K∅). From the de3nition
of , we know that a and l are the only free variables of (t′ K∅). Therefore, using
the previous lemma, (cr t (z z) (z z)) ∼b etala(t′ K∅) and the normal form t′′ of
(t′ K∅) exists and veri3es ‖t′′‖= u.
6. Completeness
Before proving the completeness of our semantics, we need a few de3nition and
axioms:
Denition 17. We de3ne the type of untyped list by
L(l)=∀X (X (∅)→∀a ∀l′ :X X (a l′)→X (l)):
Lemma 18. If AF2 t : L(l) then t is -equivalent to the church numeral Kn= xf
(fn x) where n is the length of the list l.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the proof for the type of Church numeral
itself (see [4]).
Denition 19. To prove the completeness theorem, we need to add one binary function
symbol l@l′ for the concatenation of lists and a unary function symbol tail(l) for the
function removing the last element in a list.
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Axiom 20. We then assume the following axioms:
• ∀a; l; l′ a l@l′= a (l@l′);
• ∀l ∅@l= l;
• ∀l l@∅= l;
• ∀l; l′; l′′ l@(l′@l′′)= (l@l′)@l′′;
• tail(∅)= ∅;
• ∀a tail (a ∅)=∅;
• ∀l; l′; a tail (l@al′)= l@ tail (al′).
Remark.. We could prove the completeness theorem without axioms if we added some
extra conditions in the de3nition of models. But this would pollute the extracted terms.
Lemma 21. We can prove the following: ∀l1; l2 (L(l2@l1)→ L(l1)→ L(l2))
Proof. We 3rst prove ∀l : L L (tail (l)) by an easy induction on the structure of the
list. Then ∀l; a (L(l@a ∅)→ L(l)) (i) follows easily. To prove the lemma, we proceed
by induction on the structure of the list l1 using (i) for the cons case.
Lemma 22. If t is a term extracted from a proof of Lemma 21 then t computes the
subtraction of two Church integers (when the rst argument is greater or equal to
the second one).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 18.
Theorem 23. The semantics is complete:
∀f : Truth ∅  f:
Proof. Together with the proof, we will construct the extracted term. Using the de3-
nition of , we prove X (∅; f) using the following hypothesis:
(1) x : Truth(f);
(2) z :∀f0; CX (f0C;f0);
(3) s :∀f0; g; C(X (C;f0)→X (gC; f0));
(4) l :∀f0; g; C(X (f0C; g)→X (C;f0⇒ g));
(5) a :∀f0; g; C(X (C;f0⇒ g)→X (C;f0)→X (C; g)).
We replace o by the concatenation of lists, e by ∅ and M by C; f0(L(C)→X (C;f0))
in (1). This means that we consider the model whose points are contexts and where
X de3nes the truth. Thus we have to prove the following:
• M0(@) and M1(@; ∅) are among the axioms we assumed. We can always consider
that idt= x x is the algorithmic content of the equational axioms to extract a term
from these axioms.
• To prove M2(@; C; f0(L(C)→X (C; f0))), we assume
· f :∀ q
( ∀r(L(r@q@p)→X (r@q@p;f0))→
L(q@p)→X (q@p; g)
)
(i)
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· n : L(p) (ii)
and we must prove X (p;f0 ⇒ g). Using (4) and (i), we just need to prove
∀r (L(r@f0 ∅@p)→X (r@f0∅@p; f0)) and L(f0∅@p). The second one is im-
mediate from (ii). For the 3rst one, we assume p : L(r@f0 ∅@p) and we will
prove X (r@f0 ∅@p; f0). Using Lemma 21, n : L(p) and p: L(r@f0 ∅@p), we get
(subp (succn)) : L(r)(succ is a term computing the successor of a Church numeral
and by Lemma 22, sub is a term computing the subtraction of two Church numer-
als). Then we prove X (r@f0 ∅@p; f0) by induction on r. For the nil case, we get
X (∅@f0 ∅@p; f0) using our equational axioms and (2). For the cons case, we get
X (l′@f0 ∅@p; f0)→X (a l′@f0∅@p;f0) using (3). The term extracted from this
sub-proof is
lamcp[l] = fn (l (f (p (sub p (succ n) z s)) (succ n))):
• To prove M3(C; f0(L(C)→X (C; f0))), we just need to use (5) and the extracted
term is
appcp[a] = yy′n(a (yn) (y′n)):
• Finally, nil= af a is extracted trivially from a proof of L(∅) .
The term extracted from the all proof is
cp= kzsla(k idt idt lamcp[l] appcp[a] nil):
Lemma 24. We dene n= [l=lamcp[l]; a=appcp[a]; x1=K[ K1]; : : : ; xn=K[ Kn]] where K[q] =
p(subpq z s). If ‖t′‖= u where x1; : : : ; xn are distinct and are the free variables of
u, then ‖t′′‖xn;:::;x1 = u with t′′ the normal form of (t′n) Kn.
Proof. We 3rst notice that
(lamcp[l] v Kq) ∼ (l (vK[q+ 1] q+ 1)) (i)
Then we prove the result by induction on u:
• If u = xq, then t′ = xq and (t′n Kn) ∼ (K[q] Kn) ∼ (sn−q z) and we get what we
wanted by an easy induction on n− q.
• If u = xn+1 u1, then t′ = (lxn+1 t′1) with ‖t′1‖ = u1. Using (i), we 3nd (t′n Kn) ∼
(lamcp[l] (xn+1t′1n) Kn) ∼ (lt′1n+1 n+ 1) ∼ (lt′′1 ) = t′′ where t′′1 is the nor-
mal form of (t′1n+1)n+ 1. Using the induction hypothesis, we 3nd ‖t′′‖xn;:::;x1 =
xn+1‖t′′1 ‖xn+1 ;:::;x1 = xn+1u1 = u which is what we wanted.
• If u = (u1 u2), then t′ = (at′1 t′2). We have (t′n Kn) ∼ (appcp[a] t′1 t′2 Kn) ∼ (a (t′1n Kn)
(t′2n Kn)) and we easily get the expected result using the induction hypothesis and
the de3nition of ‖t′′‖xn;:::;x1 .
Proposition 25. If (t idt idt) is -equivalent to an higher-order representation of a
term u then (cp t) is -equivalent to an internal Debruijn representation t′′ of u.
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Proof. By de3nition, we have (t idt idt) ∼ lat′ with ‖t′‖ = u. We have (cp t) ∼
(t′[l=lamcp[l]; a=appcp[a]] nil) = (t′0 nil). Using the previous lemma, we 3nd (cp t)
∼ t′′ with ‖t′′‖∅ = u which means that (cp t) is -equivalent to an internal Debruijn
representation t′′ of u.
Theorem 26. For any term t and any formula f; if AF2 t : Truth(f) then (t)x x x x
is -equivalent to the higher-order representation of a -term u with S u :f.
This theorem is a re3nement of the Proposition 13.
Proof. Let t be a term such that AF2 t : Truth(f). Then by Proposition 13 (t idt idt)
is -equivalent to an higher-order representation of a term u. Using Proposition 25,
we 3nd that (cr t) ∼ t′′ where t′′ is an internal Debruijn representation t′′ of a
term u.
Moreover, using the proof of theorem completeness, we 3nd AF2 (cr t) : ∅  f,
and using Theorem 9 we 3nd that (cr t) is -equivalent to an internal Debruijn repre-
sentation t′′0 of a term u
′ with S u′ :f. But using the de3nition of internal Debruijn
representation we have t′′∼ t′′0 implies t′′ = t′′0 (because t′′ and t′′0 are in normal form
and -equivalent to the same term) and therefore u = u′:
Thus, (cr t) is -equivalent to an internal Debruijn representation t′′ of a term u
with S u :f.
Theorem 27. Any term T extracted from a proof of the completeness (resp.
correctness) theorem translates an higher-order (resp. internal Debruijn) represen-
tation of a term u such that S u :f into an internal Debruijn (resp. higher-order)
representation of a term u′ such that S u′ :f.
Proof. This theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorems 9 and 26 using the
following properties (which are the converse of these theorems):
(1) If t is an internal Debruijn representation of u and S u :f then AF2 t : ∅  f.
We prove this by induction relating to ‖t‖xn;:::;x1 = u and x1 :f1; : : : ; xn :fn S u :f
implies AF2 t :fn; : : : ; f1  f. The proof is easy using the de3nition of ‖t‖xn;:::;x1 .
(2) If t is an higher-order representation of u and S u :f then AF2 t : Truth(f).This
result is a consequence of (1), the correctness theorem and the Proposition 16.
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